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v. Lake Charles American Press'*that a newspaper enjoyed no
privilege in publishing its false report that plaintiff failed to
appear for arraignment on a Peeping Tom charge. Plaintiff was
surety on the bond for the person arraigned, and it was clear
error on the part of the newspaper to report as it did. The
issue was whether defendant could claim privilege as set forth
in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,3 1 in which the U.S. Supreme
Court held that the public figures subject to fair comment absent
reckless disregard included private individuals involved in a
matter of public interest. Justice Sanders in speaking for the
majority on rehearing pointed out that it was the failure to
show for arraignment which was the matter of public interest
and there was no factual connection or involvement of plaintiff
with that failure to appear. If the involvement of a private
individual in a matter of public interest could be founded upon
a false report of involvement then no erroneous reporting whatever would be beyond the privilege. Accordingly, the liability
of the defendant was upheld. It is a laudable decision, furnishing
some restraint on the rapid erosion of an already too-small
island of privacy enjoyed by private citizens.
MATRIMONIAL REGIMES
Robert A. Pascal*
EFFECT OF AMENDMENTS TO LEGISLATION ON

PRFX-EXISTNG

MATRIMONIAL REGIMES

Probably the most important single issue of law raised in
any matrimonial regimes decision discussed in this section of
the Symposium is whether the 1944 amendment to article 2386
of the Civil Code applies to community of gains regimes then
already in existence. The Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, dismissed the affirmative contention with the statement: "We do
not believe this to be the intent of the amendment. The amendment was intended to affect existing community of ... gains as

well as those established after its enactment."'
serves more consideration.

The matter de-

30. 265 So.2d 206 (La. 1972).
81. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. McElwee v. McElwee, 255 So.2d 833, 888 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1971).
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'Under Louisiana law, every matrimonial regime is no more
or less than a contract between the spouses. The entire subject
matter is treated under the title "Of the Marriage Contract, and
of the Respective Rights of the Parties in Relation to Their
Property." 2 Spouses are permited to specify their matrimonial
regime before marriage in an express marriage contract. 8 Only
if the spouses fail to specify the particulars of their matrimonial
regime does the "legal"4 regime, the community of gains, come
into effect "by operation of law ' 5 or "of right.", The law's provisions on the "legal" regime, therefore, are suppletive, supplying the provisions of the marriage contract which the spouses
are presumed to have entered into tacitly in view of their presumed knowledge of the effect the law would attach to their
failure to enter into an express marriage contract. It must be
concluded, therefore, that an amendment to legislation on matrimonial regimes may not operate to alter matrimonial regimes
already in existence, whether by express or by tacit marriage
contract, without violating the Constitutional injunction against
the Impairment of obligations of contracts.
This conclusion is far-reaching, going far beyond the amendment to article 2386 by Act 286 of 1944. Examples may be given.
The rights of a wife to require her consent to the husband's
alienation of certain assets under amendments to article 2334
of the Civil Code will depend on whether her particular regime
was contracted before or after the date of the relevant amendment; and Louisiana matrimonial regimes should not be considered affected by the proposed Equal Rights Amendment if
ever adopted, for that proposed amendment does not purport to
prohibit contracts between men and women specifying their
responsibilities and their interests in things as married persons.
TiiE HUSBAND's LIABILITY FOR OBLIGATIONS
CONTRACTIM BY THE WIFE

The husband's liability for obligations contracted by the
wife is not really a matter of matrimonial regime law, but one
of the law of marriage proper, for the marriage regime of the
2. LA.
3. LA.
4. LA.
5. LA.
6.: LA.

CrV.
Civ.
CiV.
CrV.
Civ.

CODE bk. III, tit. VI.

CoDn
CODS,
CODS
CODS

arts. 2325, 2329.
title to Book III, tit. VI, ch. 3, § 1.
art. 2332.
art. 2399.
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spouses has nothing to do with the question. The decisions often
introduce confusion on the point, nevertheless, because of their
use of expressions-themselves inconsistent with law-speaking
of contracts of the wife or husband obligating or not obligating
"the community," or of the husband being obligated because he
is head of the community of gains. It has been explained sufficiently in previous Symposia that the community of gains is not
an entity, that the community of gains as such can neither be
entitled nor obligated, that only husband and wife as persons
can be entitled or obligated, that the husband is never obligated
because he is the head of the community of gains, that the wife
cannot obligate the husband for "necessaries" except as his
negotiorum gester, and that, so far as third persons are concerned, the matrimonial regime of the spouses is relevant only
to determine the assets to be considered part of the one or the
other's patrimony out of which executions of his or her obligations can be compelled.7 There is no need to repeat those expositions here. Suffice it to say that the two decisions discussed
below contain faulty expressions of the kind mentioned. It
would be well for our judges to be more careful in adhering to
the structure of the law, for not to do so can only lead to a misunderstanding of the law itself.
The decisions in Royal FurnitureCo. v. Benton8 and Watson
v. Veuleman 9 both correctly hold that the husband is not
obliged by the mere fact the wife has contracted an obligation in
her name. Both can be understood to say-though employing
incorrect language of the type mentioned above-that the husband may be obligated by the wife's act as his mandatary.
But both are incorrect insofar as they give the impression the
husband may become obligated by ratifying an act of the wife
not contracted originally on his behalf, for no one may ratify
an act not contracted on his behalf. Ratification of the act
of another is possible only if that act was contracted in the
interest of the principal, but without his authority.' 0 It is true,
of course, that anyone may assume the debt of another, and the
husband, therefore, may assume the debt of his wife; but the
7. See 32 LA. L. REv. 219, 223-28 (1972); 30 LA. L. REv. 219, 221-22 (1970);
and 28 LA. L. REV. 327, 330-33 (1968).
8. 260 La. 527, 256 So.2d 614 (1972).
9. 260 So.2d 123 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972).
10. See, e.g., LA. Civ. CoDn art. 2931.
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assumption of the debt of another may not be proved by parol. 1
In Royal Furniture, the supreme court was content to find an
assumption of the wife's obligation because (1) the plaintiff had
alleged the liability of the husband through ratification by payments made (by whom?) on the wife's obligation, and (2) the
trial court had given judgment to the plaintiffs "on their producing due proof" in support of their demand.' 2 It seems to the
writer that had the record disclosed a writing in which the husband had assumed the wife's debt Justice Barham's opinion
would have mentioned it and that resort to a presumption of
regularity in favor of the proceedings below ignores the fact
that probably there would have been no suit, much less an appeal, had a written assumption of debt been executed by the
husband. Watson is to be considered correct in holding the
burden of proving that a wife's act was on behalf of her husband
rests on the party alleging it. A contrary solution would in fact
render husbands liable for most acts of their wives. Given the
liberty of the wife to obligate herself without the authority or
concurrence of her husband, the result would be intolerable
and, in the writer's opinion, lack the fairness essential to due
process.
PROFIT SHARING AND RETIREMENT

PLANs

In Laffitte v. Laffitte,la the court of appeal clarified its previous judgment in the same case. 14 The language of the first
decision had left the impression that the wife was being awarded
a one-half interest in the whole of a profit-sharing plan contributed to by the husband both before and after marriage and declared entitled to the value thereof immediately on termination
of the community of gains even though the husband would not
be entitled to any of the fund until retirement. This decision,
so understood, was criticized by the writer in the February 1971
Symposium. 5 The clarifying second decision both emphasizes
the wife's participation in the retirement plan for that period
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

LA. Civ. COD art. 2278(3).
260 La. at 534, 256 So.2d at 617.
253 So.2d 120 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1971).
232 So.2d 92 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970).
31 LA. L. REv. 252, 253-54 (1971).
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only in which there was a community of gains between her and
her husband and her entitlement to her interest only on the
husband's being able to demand the funds himself without prejudice. A second decision involving retirement plans, decided
by the Second Circuit Court of Appeal, rendered between the
first and second Laffitte decisions, follows the first.' The Second
Circuit should correct its error as soon as the occasion arises,
for otherwise the supreme court will be compelled to issue a
writ of review the first time any application is made on the point
from any court of appeal, thus adding unnecessarily to its burdens.
A third decision on retirement plans appears to the writer
to run contrary to the intent of the special legislation on teachers' retirement benefits. Blalock v. Blalock,"' rendered by the
Second Circuit Court of Appeal, correctly decided that under
special legislation on the subject, teachers' retirement benefits
are the teacher's separate assets even though the teacher's contributions issue from earnings considered community funds; but
then, following previous decisions on the question, Blalock
awarded half the retirement fund to the non-teacher spouse by
applying the general rule of article 2408 of the Civil Code. That
article does indeed require the spouse whose separate assets have
been augmented or improved by the expenditure of common
efforts or funds to reimburse the other spouse one-half the added
value at the termination of the community of gains; but it is
submitted that the teachers' retirement legislation intended to
classify the retirement fund as separate property of the teacher
without imposing on him or her the obligation specified by the
general rule of article 2408. The writer expressed this opinion
in a previous Symposium 8 and refers the reader to it.
OTRu MATTERS

The decisions considered above by no means exhaust those
on matrimonial regimes. They evidence both the increasing
16. Hamilton v. Hamilton, 258 So.2d 661 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972).
17. 259 So,2d 367 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1972).

18. 28 LA. L. REv. 327-28 (1968).
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awareness of the bar and the bench to the possibilities of each
spouse demanding compensation for value added to the community of gains through the expenditure of separate funds, or
vice versa. 19 The main criticism of these cases is not of their
results, but of the method of accounting employed. It is incorrect to speak of compensating "the community" for the whole
of its expenditure resulting in augmentation of a spouse's separate patrimony and likewise incorrect to speak of compensating
one spouse's separate patrimony for augmentations to "the community." The proper method is indicated by article 2408 of the
Civil Code. When the separate assets of one spouse have been
augmented by community funds or energies, one-half the augmentation should be returned to him, the other half being returned to him automatically as part of his share of the community assets. Similarly, when separate funds have been used to
augment community assets, only one-half the augmentation
should be returned to the spouse, for he receives the other half
as part of his share of the community assets. The usual practice
is consistent only with the erroneous practice treating the "community" as an entity with its own creditors and debtors and
preferences in favor of "community creditors" not recognized by
the legislation.
The increased sensitivity toward accounting between the
spouses seems to be accompanied by increasing judicial willingness to be realistic in appraising evidence of the non-use of separate funds deposited in common accounts. Owens v. Owens20
is a good example.
Hurta v. Melcher2 ' is to be noted as a decision correctly
characterizing mortgage interest, taxes, and similar upkeep expenses on a separate asset used as a home for the spouses as
expenses to be paid out of community funds.
19. McElwee v, McElwee, 255 So.2d 883 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972); Owens
v. Owens, 259 So.2d 454 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972); and Blalock v. Blalock,
259 So.2d 367 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1972). It may not be clear from BZalock that
the basis of compensation should be the added value as of the time of the
dissolution of the community of gains and not the amount originally expended. See LA. Crv. CODE art. 2408.
20. See note 19 supra.
21. 260 So.2d 324 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972).

